Learned a couple things about debugging Blue Screens and hardware failures recently. You can get a lot of information from what Windows dumps to disk – to the point where, in theory, if you found your hardware issue is isolated to a specific core of your CPU, you could then disable that core if you got so lucky.
In short, remember to search the terms “windows bug check”.
Windows also has a built-in memory diagnostic tool called mdsched.
1 tablespoon of olive oil is 13.6 grams.
The recommended intake for fat is 20 to 35% of total calories, or around 44 to 77 grams of fat for a 2,000 calorie day.
If olive oil was your only source of fat, and we pretend the rest of your diet has zero fat, your recommended daily intake would be 3-6 tablespoons.
Especially when eating out, you can end up having that much in a single meal. Cooking oil is used in preparing just about everything. In a salad, the dressing alone can add up fast.
Olive oil is a refined food, and care should be taken to limit it in your diet. It is labeled a “healthy” fat relative to worse fats that are commonplace. It is calorie dense and will raise triglycerides when consumed in excess. Keep your mental model of what excess means in check.
A common mantra is to “eat in moderation”. But everyone is guilty of falling into the trap of considering something that is normal to be “moderate” when it is actually excessive.
Dietary Guidelines for Americans, 2020-2025. https://www.dietaryguidelines.gov/sites/default/files/2021-03/Dietary_Guidelines_for_Americans-2020-2025.pdf
There is so much to grapple with when trying to learn about the Israel-Palestine conflict, but along with looking at important events, I’ve found it informative reading Sara Roy’s articles from 1987 and 1999 in the Journal of Palestine Studies on Gaza’s economic conditions during the decades preceding the 2007 blockade.
Had noted these excerpts several months back and saving them here for reference.
From her economic assessment published in 1987:
The lack of economic development inside the Gaza Strip has been a result of specific Israeli policies which have aimed to restrict and have, in effect, undermined the ability of the Gazan economy to create the necessary infrastructure required for sustained economic growth. In this sense, the economy of the Gaza Strip has, over time, undergone a process of de-development. Some of the policies contributing to this process include: 1) low levels of governmental investment in social and economic infra- structure and development inside the Gaza Strip; 2) tax laws which discriminate against the Palestinian producer and weaken his economic bargaining capacity; 3) a lack of financial incentives, supports, and guarantees for Palestinian producers, commonly available to their Israeli counterparts; 4) strict control over Gaza’s terms of trade, which has resulted in restricted access to foreign markets (other than Israel and specific countries in the Arab world and Eastern Europe where Israel cannot trade) and in little, if any, protection from the importation of Israeli goods; 5) restrictions on certain forms of economic activity such as the creation of industrial zones, union-organizing, establishment of factories, cooperatives, and other business enterprises, research and training; 6) prohibitions on the development of credit facilities and other financial institutions; 7) the growing dispossession of land from the Palestinian sector; and 8) the lack of political, economic, and social linkages between Israeli and Palestinian (elite) groups and between Palestinian and other foreign groups. Furthermore, declining economic conditions inside the Arab world have resulted in fewer job opportunities for Palestinian labor, particularly among the well-educated, thereby reducing the level of foreign remittances flowing into the occupied territories.
From her assessment in 1999, Roy touches on corruption in the Palestinian Authority:
Such PA practices as the establishment of import monopolies (for as many as twenty-seven commodities), increasing corruption (particularly with regard to the misuse of foreign assistance), mismanagement of the public sector, and the failure to establish an appropriate legal and regulatory environment capable of attracting essential foreign investment have unquestionably exacerbated current economic conditions. These practices have been detailed elsewhere. But while the PA has played a damaging role economically, it is important to point out that this role is secondary to the one played by Israeli policy, which remains the primary determinant of Palestinian economic decline in the post-Oslo period.
Also comments on increasing tribalism:
Before closing the chapter on income and poverty, a word should be said about regressive social trends, characterized by rising alienation and tribalism, especially in Gaza, that point to a definition of poverty that goes beyond income and consumption levels. During 1998, there was a significant increase in interclan violence, a phenomenon that had remained dormant, at least on a wider community level, for more than two decades. Clan violence has become so prevalent that a special unit now exists within the Palestinian security service to deal with it. Members wear masks to conceal their identity in order to prevent any form of retribution against their own families. The question arises as to why Palestinians in the more impoverished Gaza Strip are reverting to tribal forms of organization and behavior. According to Dr. Eyad El Sarraj, this regression is due to growing alienation from authority-the PA-and to unabated economic distress, features that are likewise responsible for increasing rates of domestic violence, sexual abuse, and divorce. Rather than moving toward a common Palestinian identity, Gazans are reverting to the clan for security, identity, and a sense of belonging. This behavior is reinforced by the PA’s reliance on clan politics to nile: in order to get a government job, one has to be from a big clan or belong to Fatah, the ailing party. Moreover, in an environment where security forces function above the law, even ignoring decisions of the High Court of Justice, individuals have little choice but to rely on their families for protection.
On the effects of the Oslo Accords and ‘closure’:
Since September 1993, the peace process has created rather than mitigated economic hardship for the majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Arguably, there never has been a period since the beginning of Israeli occupation when the Palestinian economy has been so vulnerable. In fact, measured against the advances made by other states in the region, the Palestinian economy is weaker now than in 1967. The characteristic features of the de-development process–expropriation, integration, and deinstitutionalization–not only have continued but have accelerated since Oslo, their detrimental impact heightened by new economic realities, particularly closure.
Closure, the sealing off of the territories from Israel, from other external markets, and from each other, is the defining economic feature of the post-Oslo period. Never lifted since 1993, closure has proved extremely damaging to the Palestinian economy, particularly labor and trade, and has resulted in two new processes: growing economic “enclavization” and emerging economic autarky in an economy already weakened by de-development. Enclavization results from the diminution of economic activity between the occupied territories and Israel (and international markets) and the virtual termination of activity between the territories themselves. Economic enclavization describes a process of growing economic separation or partition and bifurcation that strikingly parallels its political counterpart, Bantustanization. Economic autarky, which is linked to enclavization, refers to a turning inward of economic behavior away from international market relations toward more traditional activities and production modes. These new dynamics, expressed in employment, trade, and income patterns, have further crippled the Palestinian economy.
It is important to note that the economic reality of the West Bank and Gaza after 1993 was shaped by the policy parameters of the Oslo accords and the Paris Economic Protocol, which collectively defined a legal framework for Palestinian economic activity and Palestine’s economic relations with Israel. While it is beyond the scope of this article to detail the various agreements and their implications for Palestinian economic activity, three critical features of this framework must be mentioned: the retention of Israeli military law (and the economic restrictions therein) during the interim phase; Israel’s full control over key factors of production, such as land, water, labor, and capital; and Israel’s complete control over external borders and the perimeters of Palestinian areas. The closure policy, furthermore, supersedes the economic cooperation and openings formalized in the various Oslo agreements, including the Paris Economic Protocol, thus making the legal openings effectively irrelevant.
Roy, S. (1987). The Gaza Strip: A Case of Economic De-Development. Journal of Palestine Studies, 17(1), 56–88. https://doi.org/10.2307/2536651
Roy, S. (1999). De-development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society Since Oslo. Journal of Palestine Studies, 28(3), 64–82. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538308